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Abstract 
This article examines the idea that believing that events occurred in the past is a non-memorial 
decision that reflects underlying processes that are distinct from recollecting events. Research on 
autobiographical memory has often focused on events that are both believed to have occurred 
and remembered, thus tending to overlook the distinction between autobiographical belief and 
recollection. Studying event representations such as false memories, believed-not-remembered 
events, and non-believed memories shows the influence of non-memorial processes on 
evaluations of occurrence. Believing that an event occurred and recollecting an event may be 
more strongly dissociated than previously stated. The relative independence of these constructs 
was examined in 2 studies. In Study 1, multiple events were cued, and then each was rated on 
autobiographical belief, recollection, and other memory characteristics. In Study 2, participants 
described a nonbelieved memory, a believed memory, and a believed-not-remembered event, and 
they made similar ratings. In both studies, structural equation modeling techniques revealed 
distinct belief and recollection latent variables. Modeling the predictors of these factors revealed 
a double dissociation: Perceptual, re-experiencing, and emotional features predicted recollection 
and not belief, whereas event plausibility strongly predicted belief and weakly predicted 
recollection. The results show that judgments of autobiographical belief and recollection are  
distinct, that each is influenced by different sources of information and processes, and that the 
strength of their relationship varies depending on the type of event under study. The concept of 
autobiographical belief is elaborated, and implications of the findings are discussed in relation to 
decision making about events, social influence on memory, metacognition, and recognition 
processes. 
Keywords: memory, recollection, autobiographical belief, dissonance, decision making
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Memory believes before knowing remembers. (William Faulkner, Light in August) 
Memory is a complicated thing, a relative to truth, but not its twin. (Barbara Kingsolver, Animal 
Dreams) 
 
Are you able to remember having breakfast today? When you think about the meal, do 
you re-evoke some of the perceptual aspects of the experience? Do you “see” the surroundings? 
Do some vivid tastes come to mind that are reminiscent of the meal? Was there coffee? 
This example of remembering a past episode is taken from one of the earliest studies of memory, 
in which Galton (1880) asked individuals to recall the appearance of the table from that 
morning’s breakfast. An extensive body of research has since examined memory for events. 
Many theorists have observed that when events are remembered, they are frequently 
accompanied by perceptual and emotional characteristics that are perceived as reminiscent of the 
original experience (Brewer, 1996; James, 1890/1950; Rubin, 2006; Tulving, 1983). 
This re-perception, or recollection, of an event is not the only mental experience that occurs 
when this breakfast is remembered; the event is also believed to have truly occurred in the past. 
Furthermore, the presence of recollection is not a necessary condition for such belief in the 
occurrence of the event. For example, a person may believe they had breakfast because they 
know that they eat breakfast daily, while lacking a vivid mental representation of that specific 
breakfast. Or a person may believe they had breakfast based on another person telling them that 
they ate breakfast that day. In these examples, belief in the event exists absent recollection. 
The current research examines the degree to which judgments of autobiographical belief 
are distinct from judgments of recollection. Such an investigation is timely, in light of a growing 
body of evidence that suggest a theoretical dissociation between these components of 
remembering. Furthermore, evidence is mounting that autobiographical belief is a non-memorial 
judgment that is strongly influenced by environmental input, particularly through the acquisition 
BELIEF IN OCCURRENCE AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY 4 
 
of socially transmitted information and via social influence (Clark, Nash, Fincham, & Mazzoni, 
2012; Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010; Otgaar, Scoboria, & Smeets, 2013). Thus, reports 
that events occurred in the autobiographical past are only partly based in recollection. 
As Brewer (1996) argued, lack of precision in the language used in research on memory 
contributes to conceptual confusion, therefore a number of terms are defined first. Throughout, 
the terms remembering and autobiographical memory (ABM) refer to the entirety of the 
experience of recalling events occurring to the self in the past. The term recollection refers to the 
mental reexperiencing or re-perceiving of an event, similar to the way it is used by Rubin (2006). 
The terms autobiographical belief and belief in occurrence refer to the truth value attributed to 
the occurrence of an event, whether or not the event is recollected (Mazzoni et al., 2010; 
Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004). 
Belief in Occurrence and Recollection Are Typically Confounded 
Much of the time, recollecting an event and believing that an event occurred happen 
simultaneously. According to Tulving (1983), “The feeling that the present recollective 
experience refers to a past event, and the feeling that the experience is veridical, that is it 
represents the past faithfully, are given as an integral part of the subjective experience of 
remembering” (p. 187). Per Brewer (1996), memories are “accompanied by a belief that the 
remembered episode was personally experienced by the individual in that individual’s past” (p. 
61), thus stressing that both components are often combined in the act of remembering. Others 
note that memories are believed to have occurred (Brown & Kulik, 1977; Lampinen & Odegard, 
2006) or are believed to be truthful representations of the past (Pillemer, 1998). 
In other words, memories are typically believed, and the study of everyday memory is typically 
the study of believed memories. Because autobiographical belief and recollection are both strong 
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in this case, it is not surprising that the concepts are often confounded. For example, studies of 
ABM are typically limited to believed memories. A prominent method is the Galton/Crovitz 
technique (Crovitz & Schiffman, 1974) in which participants are instructed to recall memories in 
response to cue words, leading to a focus on reporting believed episodes (see Robinson, 1976; 
Talarico & Mace, 2010). Similarly, flashbulb memories are characterized by strong belief that 
the event occurred (Neisser & Harsch, 1992; Talarico & Rubin, 2003). More generally, when 
experimenters ask for memories, the bias is toward reporting events which are strong in both 
recollection and autobiographical belief (Scoboria & Talarico, 2013). 
Some studies have contrasted believed memories with intentional fabrications (e.g., imaginings; 
Arbuthnott, Geelan, & Kealy, 2002; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988; Kealy, Kuiper, & 
Klein, 2006) or non-autobiographical events (e.g., experiences of other people; Crawley & 
Eacott, 2006). Such mental representations are neither recollected nor believed to have occurred, 
hence it is not surprising that people are good at discriminating between believed memories and 
not-believed-not-remembered events. If only these two classes of events are considered, it might 
be concluded that autobiographical belief and recollection co-vary completely, and there is little 
value in their distinction. Other research, however, shows that the concepts can be partly 
dissociated. 
Autobiographical Belief Without Recollection 
There is ample evidence for the existence of autobiographical belief in the absence of 
recollection. Most people endorse believing that they were born, but do not indicate having a 
memory (Brewer, 1996), showing that autobiographical beliefs are sometimes inferred from 
necessary truths (Shtulman, 2009). Autobiographical belief is sometimes based in externally 
acquired information. For example, autobiographical belief is acquired through social 
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transmission as in the case of a parent telling a child a story, or by the acquisition of evidence 
such as seeing oneself in a photograph (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002; McGinnis & Roberts, 1996). 
Theories of false memory formation propose that when events are suggested, belief in occurrence 
typically develops prior to memories (Mazzoni, Loftus, & Kirsch, 2001; Pezdek, Finger, & 
Hodge, 1997; Scoboria et al., 2004). Studies show that false beliefs can be induced without 
associated increases in recollection (Bernstein, Pernat, & Loftus, 2011; Hart & Schooler, 2006; 
Mazzoni, Loftus, Seitz, & Lynn, 1999; Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, & Gabbay, 2006; Scoboria, 
Lynn, Hessen, & Fisico, 2007). The literature also shows that correlations between 
autobiographical belief and recollection tend to be moderate and that belief ratings frequently 
exceed recollection ratings (Scoboria et al., 2007, 2004; Sharman & Scoboria, 2009). 
The literature also demonstrates that social influences have a more rapid and substantial impact 
on the formation of novel autobiographical beliefs than on recollections (see Clark et al., 2012; 
Otgaar et al., 2013). False belief ratings can increase quickly when people are told that a family 
member said that an event occurred, when a credible expert provides evidence that an event 
happened, or when individuals are told that an event occurred frequently in a self-relevant 
reference group (Mazzoni et al., 2001, 1999; Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Jimenez, 2006; van 
Golde, Sharman, & Candel, 2010). The credibility of the social source of suggestions influences 
the acceptance of suggested information (Echterhoff, Hirst, & Hussy, 2005; Meade & Roediger, 
2002) and the formation of false autobiographical beliefs (Scoboria, Wysman, & Otgaar, 2012). 
Conversely, recollection ratings remain largely unchanged following such social manipulations. 
Creating false recollections requires procedures such as repeated retrieval efforts and 
visualization to foster mental simulations that are later misattributed as recollections (Desjardins 
& Scoboria, 2007; Hessen-Kayfitz & Scoboria, 2012; Hyman & Pentland, 1996; Mazzoni & 
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Memon, 2003). Likewise, research on socially induced false confessions shows that coerced 
internalized false confessions are more likely to manifest as internalized beliefs than as memory 
like confabulations (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Nash & Wade, 2009). In sum, the content of 
socially transmitted messages about the past, the credibility of said messages, the credibility of 
the messenger, and social factors present at the time of remembering contribute to the 
development of false autobiographical beliefs, but to a much less extent (if any) to false 
memories. 
Recollection Without Autobiographical Belief 
Whereas research on the acceptance of suggested false events has illuminated the development 
of autobiographical belief in the absence of memory, work on nonbelieved memories shows that 
this dissociation may also operate in the other direction (Mazzoni et al., 2010). Nonbelieved 
memories are events that people once believed to have occurred but which they stopped 
believing. Despite the subjective withdrawal of belief, the event continues to be experienced as 
memory-like (conveying a vivid recollective experience). Mazzoni et al. found that believed and 
non-believed memories were rated as similar, and as higher than believed-not remembered 
events, on key indicators of recollection such as vividness of perceptual details and sense of re-
experiencing the past. Despite lacking autobiographical belief, mental representations for such 
events were otherwise similar in characteristic to believed memories. The participants in their 
study did not make autobiographical belief or recollection ratings about the events, so the levels 
of each associated with naturally occurring nonbelieved memories are yet to be examined. 
Social influence also plays a key role in the development of many nonbelieved memories. A 
majority of respondents in Mazzoni et al. (2010) endorsed social feedback as the reason that they 
stopped believing in their memory. Studies on the experimental inducement of nonbelieved 
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memories support this conclusion. 
Clark et al. (2012) found that when laboratory created memories are challenged by the 
experimenter telling participants that events did not occur, belief ratings decreased to a greater 
extent than recollection ratings. Otgaar et al. (2013, Study 1) found that nonbelieved memories 
occurred following the social suggestion of false childhood events. In both studies, memory 
characteristic ratings for experimentally induced nonbelieved memories resembled the naturally 
occurring nonbelieved memories reported by Mazzoni et al. (2010). The fact that social feedback 
results in the withdrawal of belief but with a sustained sense of recollection provides further 
evidence that autobiographical belief is more strongly influenced by social factors than is 
recollection. 
Of further relevance, social input that events occurred differently than they are recalled does not 
always lead to a loss of autobiographical belief. In the face of disconfirming social evidence, 
people sometimes choose to defend the belief in their memory, as in the example of the contested 
memories described by Sheen, Kemp, and Rubin (2001; see also Ikier, Tekcan, Gülgöz, & 
Küntay, 2003). Other research has reported that social input is a key source of information used 
for evaluating the occurrence of events. When unclear about or unable to recall events, people 
are most likely to turn to social sources for assistance (Wade & Garry, 2005), even when the 
only social source available is not notably credible (Nash & Takarangi, 2011). Finally, 
autobiographical belief without recollection is sufficient to motivate behavior. This has been 
demonstrated experimentally via the suggestion of false childhood events (Geraerts et al., 2008) 
and the induction of internalized false confessions (Kassin & Kiechel, 1996; Russano, Meissner, 
Narchet, & Kassin, 2005) and has been observed naturalistically in the examples of adults who 
choose to confront alleged abusers based on the belief that they had been abused as children 
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without any memory of the abuse (Ost & Nunkoosing, 2010). 
Potential Independence of Autobiographical Belief and Recollection 
The narrative to this point has presented autobiographical belief and recollection in terms of 
categories (believed memories, nonbelieved memories, etc.). The discussion of these discrete 
“types” of events, which have been studied in different parts of the literature, shows that the 
distinction matters. However, we do not imply that these categories appear in this form in nature. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, these four types of events (believed memories, not-believed-not-
remembered, believed-not-remembered, and non-believed memories) can be placed onto two 
continuous dimensions, raising the possibility that autobiographical belief and recollection 
represent distinct continuous variables that can manifest in different combinations across events. 
If they are continuous, it should be possible to empirically demonstrate the dissociation between 
these dimensions, in particular if autobiographical events are sampled in a manner that permits 
variation in each construct relative to the other. This is the goal of the current research. 
The idea of belief in occurrence as distinct from recollection is not completely new. James 
(1890/1950) described a memory as a mental representation to which the “emotion of belief” (p. 
650) is attached. The Basic Systems Model (Rubin, 2006) makes the related proposal that 
memory reports reflect two distinct metacognitive judgments, termed recollection and belief. 
Recollection is conceptualized as perceptual re-experiencing of events, and belief as the degree 
to which an event is perceived as happening in the manner recalled. We emphasize that this type 
of “belief” is conceptually distinct from the concept of autobiographical belief. For purposes of 
clarity, in this article we term the “belief” proposed in Rubin’s (2006) model as “belief in 
recollection.” The Basic Systems Model is important for its emphasis on the phenomenological 
qualities associated with remembering events. Related research has shown recollection is 
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predicted by perceptual, re-experiencing, and emotional characteristics, while items thought to 
measure belief in recollection are predicted by contextual and narrative coherence features 
(Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003; Rubin & Siegler, 2004). Hence the Basic Systems Model 
proposes that multiple metamemory judgments contribute to event appraisals, and that different 
features are reliably associated with each judgment.  
Where our approach differs is in the emphasis that Rubin’s approach puts on the appraisal of the 
veridicality of event representations (i.e., “Am I remembering the details of the event 
accurately?”), whereas our approach emphasizes the appraisal that the event truly occurred (i.e., 
“Did that event happen?”). These are theoretically distinct aspects of memory monitoring. For 
example, people can believe that an event occurred while experiencing doubt as to the accuracy 
of the memory, or they can believe that events occurred while possessing minimal recollection. 
We return to this issue in the general discussion. 
The Nested Model (Scoboria et al., 2004) makes an explicit distinction between autobiographical 
belief and recollection and proposes a partial dissociation between the concepts. This model 
arose out of efforts to understand false memory formation, and proposes that while recollected 
events are typically believed, it is not necessarily the case that believed events are recollected. 
From this is derived the argument that when recollection is high, autobiographical belief is 
inferred; and when belief is low, recollection is constrained to be low. Furthermore, the model 
integrates the concept of event plausibility (the possibility of occurrence), which is thought to be 
more strongly related to belief in occurrence than recollection. For this reason plausibility is also 
measured in the present work. Also important for the current work, the authors developed items 
to operationalize belief in occurrence, recollection, and plausibility and showed that these three 
concepts can be measured reliably and independently. 
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The Current Studies 
The study of false autobiographical beliefs, in which belief exceeds recollection, and of 
nonbelieved memories, for which recollection theoretically exceeds belief, points to the 
possibility of a stronger distinction between these constructs than previously stated. Yet, no 
research has so far measured both with the goal of estimating their dissociation. We propose that 
belief in occurrence and recollection will dissociate when measured in a manner that permits 
assessment of underlying latent constructs, and each should be predicted by distinct variables. 
The conditions needed to accomplish this include measuring each construct using multiple items, 
and obtaining sufficient variability in the measurement of each. These studies used two distinct 
methods to elicit autobiographical events. In Study 1, participants were cued to recall events, 
after which they rated the events using variables taken from prior research on autobiographical 
remembering. In Study 2, participants provided and made similar ratings for naturally occurring 
non-believed memories, believed memories, and believed not re membered events. In both 
studies, structural equation modeling techniques were used to explore the latent structure of 
autobiographical belief and recollection judgments, and to explore their predictors. We also 
included items from Rubin, Schrauf, and Greenberg (2003) to assess the relationship of our 
approach to theirs. 
We anticipated finding a reliable distinction between autobiographical belief and recollection. 
Because the cueing method used in Study 1 is likely to lead to people providing mostly believed 
memories, their separation would be revealed in a good fit for a two factor model and a moderate 
inter-factor correlation indicating overlap but not redundancy. We also expected characteristics 
previously associated with recollection (e.g., perceptual, reexperiencing) would predict more 
variance in recollection than in autobiographical belief. Based on the Nested Model, we expected 
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plausibility to predict more variance in belief than in recollection. 
In Study 2, we expected to find a similar factor model across and within different types of 
events, and that the correlation would be similar to that found in Study 1 for believed memories, 
but would be smaller for the other event types. 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants. A total of 293 students (82% female; average age  20.2 years, SD  2.02, range  18–
25) from two North American institutions participated. 
Measures of belief in occurrence, recollection, and plausibility. The four items from the 
Autobiographical Beliefs and Memory Questionnaire (ABMQ; Scoboria et al., 2004) were 
included to assess four constructs relevant to remembering autobiographical events—general 
plausibility1 (event could have happened to others), personal plausibility (event could have 
happened to self), autobiographical belief (event did happen to self), and memory (for the 
event)—on 8-point Likert style scales (anchored as not at all plausible/extremely plausible; 
definitely did not happen/definitely happened; no memory at all/clear and complete memory). 
Because multiple items per construct are needed to facilitate analyses assessing whether 
autobiographical belief and recollection are distinct constructs, two new items were added to 
query strength of recollection and autobiographical belief on 7-point scales. These four items and 
the remember/know item from Rubin, Schrauf, and Greenberg (2003) were administered to a 
pilot sample of 164 students (74% women; mean age  20.88 years, SD  3.80). Reliabilities were 
high for the two item belief in occurrence (Alpha = .89) and three item recollection  (Alpha = 
.91) scales, indicating adequate scale reliability for the main study. These items are provided in 
the Appendix. 
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Participants also rated the events on 12 characteristics that are frequently assessed in work on 
ABM on 7-point scales. Characteristics previously associated with recollection (Johnson et al., 
1988; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003) included reexperiencing (reliving, mental time travel; 
averaged), perceptual detail, spatial setting, persuasion, current emotion (positive, negative, 
intensity), event specificity, importance, and prior rehearsal (thought, talked; averaged). Personal 
plausibility was included as a predictor of autobiographical belief (Scoboria et al., 2004). The 
belief in memory item from Rubin, Schrauf, and Greenberg (2003) was also included to assess 
its connection with the other items administered. These items are provided in the online 
supplemental materials. 
Procedure. The study was administered via computer using Direct RT software (Version 2007; 
Jarvis, 2007). Participants were cued to recall five childhood events (from before 6 years of age), 
one at a time, and to provide a brief 2–3 word description sufficient to remind them of the event. 
After cueing, the descriptions were presented one at a time in random order and participants 
rated each using the two autobiographical belief, three recollection, and 12 other items in a fixed 
order. Events from early life were selected to encourage retrieval of events that might be less 
accessible, and therefore more variable in recollection and belief in occurrence. Multiple events 
were cued because generating only one event would likely lead to recall of highly rehearsed 
memories which would be near ceiling for both constructs. Cueing for all events before soliciting 
ratings ensured that exposure to items could not bias the selection of events. This method 
allowed sampling of events without revealing the interest of the study in belief and recollection. 
Results 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to test the latent structure of belief and recollection 
judgments. CFA is a structural equation modeling technique that requires that one or more 
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theoretical models be specified in advance of testing the fit of data to the model. The researcher 
defines in advance what factors will be present and onto which specific factor(s) items will load. 
The data are then used to evaluate the extent to which the model explains covariance amongst the 
measured variables, resulting in an estimate of the degree to which the proposed theoretical 
model represents a good fit to the data. Further details are provided in the online supplemental 
materials. Confidence intervals for path coefficients and correlations were estimated based on 
bootstrapping of 1,000 samples. 
Ratings for each item were averaged across the five events. Six multivariate outliers were 
removed based on Mahalanobis’s D2, using a cutoff corresponding to p  .001, resulting in a final 
total of 287 cases. Two models were then tested in EQS Version 6.1, using robust estimation (to 
account for some skewness in some variables) for chi-square, fit indices, and standard errors. 
Model fit was assessed per the recommendations of Jackson, Gillaspy, and Purc-Stephenson 
(2009). A model with the five belief and recollection items loading on the same latent factor did 
not fit the data well, Satorra–Bentler (S-B; Satorra & Bentler, 1994) Scaled 2(5)  76.42, p  .001; 
comparative fit index (CFI)  .729; root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA)  .227 
(90% CI [.183, .271]). The proposed two factor model was a good fit to the data, S-B 2(4)  7.61, 
p  .055; CFI  .986; RMSEA  .073 (90% CI [.000, .140]). The item loadings and the factor 
correlation are presented in Figure 2. We used 1,000 bootstrap samples for the two factor model, 
and found agreement between significance tests related to loadings of measured variables on 
latent variables. This shows that the best fitting model was robust to violation of the normality 
assumption. The moderate factor correlation (r  .516, 95% CI [.38, .63]) was likely due to the 
fact that the cueing approach primarily elicited believed memories, and few instances in which 
recollection exceeded belief (see Table 1). Given the preponderance of believed memories 
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elicited by the cueing method, these results indicate two distinct latent factors that are 
moderately correlated when believed memories are cued. 
The next analyses included the plausibility and memory characteristic indices in the two factor 
model to predict these factors. We first added all of the predictors (perceptual, setting, 
reexperiencing [average of “reliving” and “mental time travel”]), specificity, persuasion, 
significance, rehearsal [average of “thought” and “talked”], positive emotion, negative emotion, 
emotion intensity, and personal plausibility). In the first model, all predictor variables were 
allowed to predict both latent variables, and all predictors were allowed to correlate. The 
disturbance terms for the two latent variables were allowed to correlate in order to determine 
whether the residual relationship between belief in occurrence and resolution would be 
attenuated after adding the predictors. It was expected that the model fit would deteriorate 
through the addition of new variables, because our goal was only  to predict the latent variables, 
and not to model the relationships amongst the predictors. We anticipated that perception and 
reexperiencing would predict recollection, and more substantially than belief in occurrence, 
while plausibility would predict belief in occurrence more substantially than recollection. 
The initial model indicated that negative emotion, positive emotion, and rehearsal did not predict 
either factor, and these were dropped. The final predictor model including the remaining 
predictors yielded a S-B 2(27)  100.92, p  .001, with a CFI of .935 and a RMSEA of .098 (90% 
CI [.078, .118]). The standardized coefficients are presented in Table 2, which shows that 
perception, re-experiencing, emotion intensity, and specificity uniquely predicted recollection. 
Plausibility predicted recollection weakly but was a strong predictor of belief in occurrence. 
Only spatial setting predicted both belief in occurrence and recollection at similar levels. 
Substantial variance of both latent belief in occurrence (R2  .508) and recollection (R2  .859) was 
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accounted for by these specific predictors (perception, reexperiencing, emotion, specificity, 
plausibility, spatial for recollection; plausibility and spatial for belief in occurrence). Finally, 
the correlation between the latent variables (disturbance terms) when the plausibility and 
memory characteristic items were added was reduced to r  .304 (95% CI [.11, .49]; from r  .516, 
95% CI [.38, .63]), suggesting that as contextual variables are taken into account, 
autobiographical belief and recollection become more independent. 
We fit a final model in which we trimmed all non-significant pathways (see the bottom of Table 
1). This model included plausibility and spatial setting to predict belief in occurrence, and 
included perception, spatial setting, re-experiencing, plausibility, feeling intensity, persuade, and 
specificity to predict recollection. The model fit was similar to the previous one, S-B 2(29)  
98.41, p  .001; CFI  .934; RMSEA  .091 (90% CI [.072, .111]). The predictors accounted for 
substantial variance in belief in occurrence (R2  .478) and recollection (R2  .856), and the 
correlation between the latent variables (disturbance terms) remained unchanged at r  .304. 
We then included the “belief in memory” item (taken from Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003) 
in the initial structural model to assess how it overlapped with the constructs examined here. 
When this item was specified to cross load on both factors the fit was acceptable: S-B 2(7)  
15.65, p  .029; CFI  .976; RMSEA  .067 (90% CI [.020, .111]). Only the loading (.621) on 
recollection was significant, indicating that this item does not assess belief in occurrence. 
Discussion 
The results support the view that belief in occurrence and recollection reflect distinct latent 
constructs. The structural models provided support for two constructs rather than one dimension 
underlying decisions about remembering. These factors correlated only at a moderate level. 
While this moderate correlation might be interpreted as indicating that the two factors are 
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overlapping, we need to notice first that with the method used in Study 1 the moderate level of 
correlation can be attributed to the preponderance of believed memories. This correlation might 
simply indicate that we tend to trust our recollections, as we believe they correspond to events 
that really happened in the past. Indeed, recollection represents a basis for belief (“If I remember, 
then it must have happened”). While it is tempting to conclude from this correlation that 
recollections necessarily correspond to real events, the large literature on believed false 
memories suggests some caution. Hence, our stress on the possibility that the correlation should 
more accurately be interpreted as reflecting the general perceived reliability and utility of 
memory, rather than the objective reality of the recollected events. 
The second result that indicates that belief and recollection are distinct is the double dissociation 
observed between the predictors of the constructs. Items that predicted recollection well 
(perceptual, reexperiencing, emotion intensity, event specificity) did not predict belief.  
Conversely, plausibility predicted belief strongly and recollection only weakly (only spatial 
setting predicted both at similar levels). Thus, even when most reported items are believed 
memories, variables that predict recollection do not predict belief. 
While these findings are consistent with work that shows that mental simulation and 
reexperiencing are associated with recollection, spatial/contextual features are more broadly 
associated with event attributions, and plausibility primarily predicts belief in occurrence (Addis, 
Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; Johnson et al., 1988; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003; 
Scoboria et al., 2004), it is worth noticing that the pattern of results obtained with predictors is 
also in line also with the Nested Model (Scoboria et al., 2004). The Nested Model describes the 
relationship between plausibility, belief in occurrence, and recollection obtained when people are 
asked to report past events. Here, people reported only plausible events, the great majority of 
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which are believed events, including believed memories. Hence, plausibility is expected to 
correlate weakly with recollection. 
In line with the interpretation that belief and recollection are distinct constructs, it is also 
important to notice that the correlation between the latent constructs decreased when the 
predictors were added to the regression model. This reflects the fact that the predictors loaded 
more clearly and distinctly on only one factor and not the other. In other words, they represent 
elements (or processes) that are much more involved in one latent construct than the other. 
Taking all these results together, the moderate correlation between the two constructs should be 
interpreted as indicating that belief in occurrence and recollection are distinct factors that under 
some circumstances co-vary.  
One additional point that these results reveal is that the concept of “belief” proposed by Rubin, 
Schrauf, and Greenberg (2003) does not overlap with belief in occurrence. In fact, it loads on the 
recollection factor, rather than on the belief in occurrence factor. 
Finally, it should be noted that the correlation between the constructs remains misestimated in 
Study 1, because the events elicited using the cueing method rarely resulted in cases in which 
belief was rated lower than recollection. Hence, the full implication of the dissociation as implied 
by nonbelieved memories in Mazzoni et al. (2010) was not revealed in this study. A complete 
analysis of the relationship implied in Figure 1 requires including events for which recollection 
exceeds belief. Including nonbelieved memories along with believed memories and believed not 
remembered events achieves this goal. The inclusion of distinct event types has the potential to 
replicate the findings of Study 1 while more clearly revealing the degree of the distinction under 
study. For example, the finding that belief in occurrence and recollection are distinct implies that 
the correlation between the two should be different for different types of events (e.g., higher for 
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believed memories than for other event types). 
As there is no established method for cuing non-believed memories without asking participants 
directly, in Study 2 we adopted the method from Mazzoni et al. (2010). Participants identified 
non-believed memories, believed memories, and believed-notremembered events, and rated each 
on autobiographical belief, recollection, and related characteristics. Structural equation modeling 
(SEM) was used to model these events simultaneously. This permitted the evaluation of several 
hypotheses: (1) that belief in occurrence and recollection are distinct latent constructs within and 
across event types, (2) that indicators load reliably onto each construct within each event, (3) that 
correlations between the constructs differ by event type, (4) whether method variance due to 
repeating items across events impacts the findings, (5) whether the rating of events is driven by 
individual differences, and (6) whether the pattern of predictors from Study 1 replicates. 
Replicating Study 1 under these distinct conditions would provide compelling support for the 
hypothesis that belief in occurrence and recollection are distinct components of remembering. 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants. All students who enrolled in a participant pool at one North American university 
over 8 months answered a screening question that defined nonbelieved memories and queried 
whether they had a nonbelieved memory. Those who responded affirmatively were eligible for 
the study. The final sample included 187 students (71% women; age  18–41 years, M  21.23, SD  
4.25) who provided a valid non-believed memory (the event description provided by the 
participant met the definition of a nonbelieved memory; e.g., some cases represented wishes that 
past events had not happened). 
Materials and procedure. The same autobiographical belief and recollection items from Study 
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1 were used, and one new autobiographical belief item was added (truly occurred; see the 
Appendix). The list of memory characteristics drawn from the literature was more exhaustive 
and included 21 items: perceptual (visual, auditory, touch, smell/taste), spatial (setting; location 
of objects, people), temporal (time, duration), re-experiencing (reliving, mental time travel; 
averaged), rehearsal, complexity, narrative coherence, emotion (past content; current and past 
intensity; positive, negative valence), significance, and connectedness to other memories. The 
new items introduced in Study 2 (specific perceptual items, temporal, significance, complexity, 
coherence, connectedness) are theoretically interesting as shown by prior work (Rubin, Schrauf, 
& Greenberg, 2003), which makes their relationships to the constructs of interest worth 
examining. In addition to the item used in Study 1, the “willingness to testify” item from Rubin, 
Schrauf, and Greenberg (2003) was included as another potential indicator of belief in 
recollection. 
Participants completed an online inventory about four events in a fixed order: (1) a non-believed 
memory, (2) a believed memory, and (3) a believed-but-not-remembered event, and (4) as a 
control, a not-believed-not-remembered event (an event that happened to another person; see 
Crawley & Eacott, 2006). For each event, participants described what happened, dated the event, 
and rated plausibility, belief, recollection and associated characteristics. For the nonbelieved 
memory, participants also described why they stopped believing their memory and dated when 
this happened. For the believed memory and believed-not-remembered event, participants were 
asked to report an event that dated to the age of their non-believed memory. All event 
descriptions were read, and 10 were dropped (3 believed memories; 7 believed-not-remembered) 
because the response clearly did not fit the definition of the event type. All events were episodic 
in nature, defined as taking place at a specific time and location. The timing and reasons for with 
BELIEF IN OCCURRENCE AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY 21 
 
drawal of belief are beyond the scope of this article and are not reported here. 
Results 
CFA procedures were again used to test a series of two factor models. In this study the fit of the 
models were tested simultaneously across three event types (believed memory, nonbelieved 
memory, believed not remembered event). EQS (Version 6.1) was used for all analyses, and the 
same approach to estimating fit was used as in Study 1. Five multivariate outliers were removed 
from the analyses. A description of the final model is provided below; complete information on 
the modeling approach and all models tested is provided in the online supplemental materials. 
Figure 3 contains a drawing of the final model with the standardized factor loadings for each 
item on the latent variables (LVs) and the LV correlations. This model provided a good fit with 
the data, S-B 2(108)  143.10, p  .013; CFI  .966; RMSEA  .042 (90% CI [.020, .060]); 
standardized root-mean-square residual (SRMR)  .080. As in Study 1, to assess the accuracy of 
significance levels in the presence of non-normality, we used 1,000 bootstrap samples and found 
agreement between significance tests related to latent variable correlations and loadings of 
measured variables on latent variables. 
Figure 3 is described to assist readers who may be less familiar with CFA models. Latent 
(unobserved) variables are indicated by ovals. There are three LVs each for belief and 
recollection, one for each type of event. The measured items (observed variables) are 
indicated by rectangles. Three items define each LV. Arrows point from the latent to the 
observed variables, indicating the assumption that underlying processes give rise to item 
responses. The variables on the left side of the figure depict belief in occurrence, and those on 
the right side depict recollection. The circles to the extreme right and left represent the residual 
variance associated with each item. Double-arrowed curved lines indicate correlations. The 
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correlations are estimated correlations between latent variables. 
All of the item loadings onto latent variables were statistically significant and large. The 
correlations between the LVs within each event were statistically significant. This correlation 
was largest for believed memories (r  .45, 95% CI [.34, .56]), was numerically smaller for non-
believed memories (r  .30, 95% CI [.12, .48]), and was negative for believed-not-remembered 
events (r  .17, 95% CI [.36, .09]), confirming the hypothesis that the relationship between 
belief in occurrence and recollection differs depending on the type of event under study. The 
correlations for belief and recollection between believed memories and believed-not-
remembered events were significant but weak, and the correlations for belief and recollection 
between non-believed memories and the other events were not significant (these are the 
“vertical” correlations at the center of the figure). This indicates  that there was no systematic 
bias in the ratings with some individuals rating all events higher and others rating all events 
lower. Hence, individual differences were distributed mostly independently across the events, 
further supporting the key theoretical distinction. 
To examine the issue of repeating of measures across the events, whether the repetition of items 
across events affected parameter estimates in the model, we created an additional model using a 
Multi-Trait Multi-Method approach (Marsh & Grayson, 1995; see the online supplemental 
materials for further detail). This involved correlating the error terms for repeated items across 
events. Of these correlations, just two were significant, which indicates that method variance did 
not notably influence estimates for the other model parameters. In other words, the sampling 
method worked well—people made distinct ratings about the different events, and ratings on 
preceding events did not influence ratings on subsequent events. 
We next turned to predicting the autobiographical belief and recollection factors. The first model 
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replicated the final prediction model from Study 1. Items were loaded on the LVs for the event 
type, and predictors were allowed to correlate and disturbance terms for LVs within event type 
were also allowed to correlate. 
The “perception” item was replaced in this study by the “visual detail” item, and the 
“significance” item was not available. This model was a good fit (RMSEA  .059, 90% CI [.052, 
.065]), and the pathways of the predictors for believed memories reasonably matched those in 
Study 1. We next examined whether any additional items might be included in model. After 
eliminating items that did not load reliably or that resulted in problems with model convergence, 
one new item was included (connectedness). Also, the “persuade” item showed an affinity for 
autobiographical belief  (particularly for nonbelieved memories); hence, this item was allowed to 
predict the autobiographical belief LVs. Path coefficients for the final predictor model (RMSEA  
.053, 90% CI [.047, .060]) are presented in Table 3. Across the event types, visual, 
reexperiencing, and emotion intensity uniquely predicted recollection; connectedness predicted 
only belief in occurrence; plausibility predicted autobiographical belief strongly and recollection 
weakly; and persuasion and spatial details predicted both factors. The pattern varied slightly 
across the events types. As in Study 1, the correlations between the LVs changed after including 
the predictors: for believed memories, from .45 to .24 (95% CI [.12, .50]); for nonbelieved 
memories, from .30 to .19 (95% CI [.12, .50]); and for believed not remembered, from .17 to .04 
(95% CI [.19, .28]).  
To this point, the estimates for the relationship between autobiographical belief and recollection 
have been estimated separately for each type of event. In order to estimate the relationship 
between the constructs across events, we averaged items across the three events and conducted 
the same type of SEM modeling. The model was an excellent fit to the data: CFI  .995; RMSEA  
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.037 (90% CI [.000, .072]); SRMR  .032. The correlation between the LVs was estimated as .12 
(95% CI [.07, .29]). Adding the same predictors as in the preceding paragraph to this model 
resulted in an estimated relationship of .04 (95% CI [.17, .29]). 
Additional analyses. The analyses to this point focus on item covariance. The distinction 
between the event types also assumes differences in average autobiographical belief and 
recollection ratings. Average scores on the factors (see Figure 4) showed the expected pattern. 
For believed memories, both factors were rated equal and high. For nonbelieved memories, 
recollection was rated higher than belief, and the converse was the case for believed not 
remembered events. It is interesting that the difference between autobiographical belief and 
recollection for nonbelieved memories was just 1.28 (SD 1.74) on average, indicating that the 
direction of the difference is more important than the magnitude. The non-believed non-
remembered (control) event showed that, as expected, both factors were rated low when 
remembering events that happened to other people. 
We also examined how the “belief in recollection” items drawn from Rubin, Schrauf, and 
Greenberg (2003; testify, belief in memory, witness), related to the factors. The “testify” item 
was strongly bi-modal and hence was not suitable for further analysis. Similar to Study 1, the 
“belief in memory” item loaded primarily on the recollection factor for believed memories (.53, 
respectively, on recollection, vs. .16 on belief), and loaded inconsistently for the other events. 
This further suggests that this item taps something other than autobiographical belief. 
General Discussion 
The results of the two studies show that belief in occurrence and recollection represent distinct 
components that are typically both present when people remember autobiographical events. 
Whereas prior research has shown a partial dissociation (Scoboria et al., 2004), this is the first 
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research to demonstrate their strong independence. In conventional psychometric terms, in both 
studies belief in occurrence and recollection were each found to be reliable and valid constructs 
that underlay reports about autobiographical events. They were found to be distinct even in 
conditions in which they would be expected to be the most overlapping (i.e., believed memories). 
The highest estimate of their correspondence indicated no more than 25% shared variance, and 
10% shared variance appears to represent the best estimate of the overlap of the constructs for 
believed memories (Study 1). The amount of nonoverlapping variance is clearly substantial. The 
correlation between the constructs varied depending on the type of event under examination 
(Study 2), being the highest for believed memories, lower for events that are remembered but not 
believed, and reversing for believed-not-remembered events. The higher correlation for believed 
memories suggests that people typically trust that their recollections reflect events that genuinely 
occurred. Predicting the constructs provided good evidence for convergent and divergent 
validity, and revealed a double dissociation in their predictors. Some variables that predicted 
recollection did not predict autobiographical belief, and conversely, factors that predicted 
autobiographical beliefs did not predict recollection (or predicted it only weakly). Furthermore, 
the models tested in Study 2 provided evidence that repeated measures and individual differences 
in responding did not threaten the validity of these conclusions. 
Centrality of Autobiographical Belief in Remembering 
Recollection in our approach is largely consistent with current conceptualizations in the 
literature. Recollection involves the experience of reinstatement of perceptual/temporal/spatial 
aspects of past perceptual states and is comprised of mental simulation accompanied by a sense 
of re-experiencing (Addis et al., 2009; Brewer, 1996; Rubin, 2006). Differently from prior 
conceptualizations, belief in occurrence is defined as the subjective evaluation of the proposition 
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that an event genuinely occurred in the autobiographical past (Mazzoni et al., 2010). Similar to 
arguments made about memory attributions in the Reality Monitoring (RM) framework 
(Lindsay, 2008; Johnson, Raye, Mitchell, & Ankudowich, 2011) and in the Basic Systems Model 
(Rubin, 2006), recollection and autobiographical belief are each attributions that are based in 
phenomenal experience, available information, and features of the retrieval context at the time of 
remembering. Our approach differs from preceding views in emphasizing the key role of belief 
in occurrence as the summative evaluation of the truth status of events. The inputs to 
autobiographical belief are not based only on recollection but also on a plethora of diverse 
information that are available at the time of remembering. 
Inspired in part by James’s (1890/1950) discussion of remembering, we propose that 
autobiographical belief is comprised of three distinct attributions: (1) to actual experience, (2) to 
the self, and (3) to the past. Removal of any of these components renders the mental 
representation something other than a believed past occurrence. To provide one example for 
each, without actual experience the representation may be labeled a fantasy; without self, the 
representation may be labeled as the experience of another; without the past, the representation 
may be labeled a plan for a future event. The labeling of events as past occurrences is supported 
by these components. We note that the attribution of events as having occurred does not require 
recollection at all, as they can be based on social information, factual knowledge, inferential 
processes, and so forth (see also Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002). 
We assume that once autobiographical beliefs, and by extension believed recollections, are 
formed, beliefs tends to remain stable unless challenged by salient discrepant information, in a 
way similar to factual beliefs. In reasoning, for example, it is known that revision of factual 
beliefs is typically difficult (Elio & Pellettier, 1997), as people not only are motivated to 
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maintain a consistent set of beliefs, but also consistent beliefs are a hallmark of rationality. In 
these cases belief change occurs only as a function of the presentation of information 
inconsistent with prior beliefs (e.g., Elio & Pelletier, 1997; Johnson-Laird, Girotto, & Legrenzi, 
2004) or changes in attitude (Festinger, 1957). There are a variety of reasons that 
autobiographical beliefs are resistant to change, of which we note three. One is that the human 
cognitive system is prone to believing propositions unless they are explicitly evaluated and 
rejected (Conway, 1997; Gilbert, 1991). This implies that believing in something is the default 
mode when processing information. Another is that confirmation bias results in the avoidance or 
discounting of contradictory evidence (Nickerson, 1998). 
The consequence is that contradictory information is not always processed. A third reason is that 
any cognitive experience which is consistent with expectations as to what one expects to be a 
“good memory” leads to believing the event that is in the mental representation (see Michael, 
Garry, & Kirsch, 2012). This means that when people experience the psychological or 
physiological markers that they have learned to associate with remembering, they assume that 
the contents of awareness reflect true past experiences. The misattribution of familiarity or 
processing fluency as reflecting past experience is a common example of this third reason 
(Bernstein, Whittlesea, & Loftus, 2002). The evidence from false memories and nonbelieved 
memories shows that autobiographical belief revision can occur when subjectively experienced 
sources of information about an event disagree. This can take the form of a discrepancy between 
the content of the belief and the content of recollection. When uncertain about a memory, people 
are motivated to resolve the discrepancy (Kemp & Burt, 2006). In the case of false memory 
formation, people initially do not believe that an event occurred but receive a suggestion that it 
did occur; hence there is a discrepancy between current (lack of) autobiographical belief and 
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another presumably credible source of information about the event. Some accept the suggestion 
and come to believe that the event did occur (i.e., they change the belief), some reject the event 
and maintain the original belief (“that did not happen”), while others seek additional information 
before making a decision (e.g., asking a parent). Conversely, in the case of nonbelieved 
memories, individuals have a strongly believed memory that is discrepant with newly acquired 
information. Here, people may decide to relinquish their belief in the event, producing a 
nonbelieved memory (see Sacks, 2005, for an illustrative example). Alternatively, they may 
reject the new information and defend their belief in the event; disputed memories are one 
example of this outcome (Sheen et al., 2001). 
What all of these cases have in common is that two or more sources of information are, at least 
temporarily, in disagreement regarding the status of autobiographical belief. The disagreement 
between salient sources of information produces cognitive dissonance, which people are 
motivated to resolve (Festinger, 1957). 
Adapting the dissonance theory to the case of discrepancy between autobiographical belief and 
recollection as exemplified by nonbelieved memories, a person who obtains information that 
contradicts a current memory has at least three options to reduce the dissonance: They can 
devalue their memory (leading to a nonbelieved memory), they can devalue the new information 
and maintain the original autobiographical belief (leading to a “defended memory”), or they can 
diminish the importance of the event (it does not matter whether or not the event in fact 
happened). The dissonance can originate from discrepancies between internal cognitive 
processes, socially transmitted information, and other features of the social environment. To 
provide one example, motivations to maintain close and meaningful social relationships may 
override motivations to be accurate or to maintain the sense that the event belongs to the self 
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(Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004), thus motivating changes in autobiographical belief. The converse 
implication is that when belief in occurrence and recollection are in agreement, they will be 
mutually reinforcing. 
In any case, social influence is central to the formation and revision of autobiographical beliefs. 
This is likely because ABM has developed in, occurs in, and serves social functions (Alea & 
Bluck, 2003; Pillemer, 1998; see also Blank, 2009). Shared remembering increases knowledge 
about group members, promotes identity within groups, and leads to development of shared 
narratives (Hyman, 1994). Having multiple perceivers who communicate about common 
experiences conveys the advantage that perspectives can be integrated, extending knowledge 
beyond direct experience. Sharing memories enriches knowledge about the environment, 
promoting survival. The group can facilitate learning about events that are inaccessible, for 
which the individual was not present, or which the individual is incapable of remembering (e.g., 
early life events). In light of this, it seems likely that a notable proportion of autobiographical 
memory must be comprised of believed events that are based partly on editing due to social 
feedback, or that are entirely based in the social and cultural transmission of information. 
Of course, once two people see an event from different vantage points, the information available 
to each differs and discrepancies must somehow be reconciled when shared. When people 
discuss shared events and provide different reports, socially produced cognitive dissonance 
presumably results within each individual. 
The impact of such dissonance is illustrated in the case of a woman who kept a detailed diary of 
events for decades because she was distressed by arguments in her family about what had 
occurred in the past (Catal & Fitzgerald, 2004). One might speculate that such social dissonance 
is ideally resolved to arrive at the most accurate account of events that simultaneously achieves 
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social goals. However, accuracy motivations, personal motivations regarding ownership of 
events, and social motives may not coincide. People are sometimes motivated to maintain beliefs 
in events that are central to their sense of self (Sheen et al., 2001). At other times people may 
alter their memory beliefs in order to escape social confrontation (Kassin, 1997). What does 
seem apparent is that as soon as organisms develop the capacity to communicate about 
experiences that they have perceived even somewhat differently, disparities will result which 
must be resolved in order to promote social cohesion. Agreeing with versions of events proposed 
by others is sometimes done to avoid conflict and/or to enhance the quality of the relationship. 
Social influences on remembering are currently a topic of growing interest in the field. It is 
beyond the scope of this article to provide a survey. We instead note several related domains of 
interest within this area, to demonstrate the potential reach of the distinction emphasized in this 
work. Research on topics such as collaborative remembering, memory conformity, and 
conversational remembering speak to the transactional nature of remembering within the social 
context (see Hirst & Echterhoff, 2012, for a review). Some propose that memory is inherently 
social, in that how people learn to remember and communicate about remembering is learned in 
the context of early relationships (Fivush, Haden, & Reese, 2006). Social influence is important 
for understanding individuals who come to recall past abuse in therapy and later retract said 
memories. Such cases reveal social and cognitive factors which contribute to the development 
and withdrawal of memories, some of which appear to be based in false recollection, and others 
in false belief absent recollection (Ost & Nunkoosing, 2010; Sarbin, 1998). 
Although our data provide a strong argument on the distinction between recollection and belief 
in occurrence, this distinction has tended to be overlooked in the literature. This is not surprising, 
because both constructs are robustly present in the reports that people provide when asked for 
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memories. Their empirical disambiguation requires that each is assessed under conditions where 
each shows sufficient variability independent of the other. Hence, while they can be 
distinguished if directly assessed with reliable items (Study 1), the need to do so only becomes 
apparent when the existence of counterintuitive event representations such as nonbelieved 
memories and believed-not-remembered events is known. 
One interpretation as to why recollections tend to be believed is that memory is typically 
sufficiently reliable to be useful. Recollective experience is a valid predictor of the occurrence of 
events enough of the time. It is interesting to notice, however, that even in these cases the degree 
of correspondence between recollection and belief in occurrence is at the greatest moderate, 
which suggests that recollection alone cannot explain why a remembered event is deemed to 
have occurred. Much more is needed to understand why people decide that a certain event had 
happened, or why they are certain that they had a particular experience in their life. 
Our research highlights the importance of autobiographical belief as a key component of 
remembering, and brings into question the degree to which prior memory findings are influenced 
by recollection, autobiographical belief, or their combination. Most research in autobiographical 
memory has used either diary methods, in which participants are asked to report memories of 
personal events that are remembered during their daily life, or the GaltonCrovitz method, in 
which cues are presented and participants are requested to report memories about their past 
elicited by the cues. 
In many instances, strong claims have been made from data so collected about how 
autobiographical memory is structured and organized (e.g., Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). 
However it is not clear the extent to which such organization reflects the influence of 
recollection, of autobiographical belief, or a combination of the two. We also need to underline 
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that autobiographical semantic knowledge does not correspond to the belief in occurrence. 
While the first reflects factual knowledge about oneself, the latter represents the final results of 
the decision about whether an event happened in reality. Even the important attempts of 
examining the recollective and accuracy appraisal components of autobiographical reports done 
in previous work do not draw a real distinction between the two elements. We have shown that 
the “belief” variables measured in these studies (e.g., Rubin, 2006) do not measure the 
occurrence of the reported event, but the belief in the accuracy of the memory. 
Another good example of the importance of distinguishing between belief in occurrence and 
recollection is represented by the “crashing memory” effect, as it shows that what is superficially 
reported as a memory can be in effect a belief. In crashing memory studies, participants are 
asked whether they remember seeing non-existent media footage for aspects of prominent public 
events (e.g., video footage of the moment of the car crash that ended the life of Diana, Princess 
of Wales). Typically a large number of participants endorse remembering seeing the non-existent 
footage, an effect that was initially described as a false memory phenom enon (Crombag, 
Wagenaar, & Van Koppen, 1996). More recently, however, Smeets, Telgen, Ost, Jelicic, and 
Merckelbach (2009) examined the degree to which this effect was rooted in recollection as 
opposed to being due to communicative factors related to how the question about the event was 
asked. They found that while the standard question did initially elicit endorsements of memory, 
follow up questioning revealed that a majority of the reports in fact reflected autobiographical 
beliefs (“I believe I saw the video, but do not recollect the video itself”) or plausibility 
statements (“I must have seen the video”) and not recollection. They noted that a very interesting 
10% of individuals did continue to insist they recalled seeing the video even after being informed 
that it did not exist. While these people clearly do appear to have false memories, the “false 
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memories” elicited with the crashing memory procedure are then mostly the result of belief 
judgments, at times of plausibility judgments, and only rarely reflect recollection. Similarly, in 
studies of memory contagion it is critical to distinguish between reports that are based in 
recollection and those that are due to other factors (Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001). 
Such studies document that individuals incorporate erroneous information recalled by others into 
their own memory reports. However, it is important to distinguish whether changes in 
individuals’ memory reports in response to social input are due to compliance with the 
experimental situation or are due to internal changes in beliefs about studied material (Meade & 
Roediger, 2002). False confessions might be thought of as an extreme example of memory 
contagion, and work on the issue has shown that it is important to distinguish between compliant 
false confessions, which are simply due to acquiescence, internalized false confessions (which 
are a type of autobiographical belief), and confabulated false confessions (in which recollection 
is at play; Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). 
Distinguishing between internalized and confabulated false confessions reflects the distinction 
between autobiographical belief and recollection, and is key to understanding the different routes 
by which confessions come about. The distinction is also crucial for evaluating the consequences 
that false confessions can have in real life (e.g., when false confessions can be retracted). Hence, 
it is important to assess with care the bases for memory reports. What appear to be believed 
memories may be instead autobiographical beliefs that are based in non-recollective information, 
such as learning from another person that an event occurred, or inferring that an event must have 
happened from other factual data. 
Our results also highlight the importance of assessing the meaning assigned to common terms 
when talking about memory reports. This has been shown for example by Otgaar et al. (2013), 
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who reported, in the context of false memory implantation studies, cases in which subjective 
reports of events as believed versus remembered disagreed with objective judgments that events 
were or were not remembered (e.g., judged as a memory, reported as believed but not 
remembered by the participant, and vice versa). 
They argued that people often use language associated with remembering quite loosely to 
describe events that have varying levels of associated autobiographical belief and recollection. 
Use of words such as “remember” and “memory” do not necessarily indicate recollection, while 
the failure to use such words does not preclude the presence of recollection. Speaking with 
conviction about past events may be driven by strength of belief, and does not necessarily 
indicate recollection. Recollection is also not necessary for people to decide how to act, as shown 
by forensic cases in which people have decided to sue family members for a sexual abuse that 
they did not recollect, but instead strongly believed had happened. The critical point we wish to 
make here is that in order to understand memory reports it is essential to assess the degree to 
which they are supported by belief or recollection or both, without relying on the terminology 
used by the participants. The methodology used in the current studies represents one way to 
accomplish this task. 
Belief in Occurrence, Recollection, and Confidence 
To return to the topic of metacognition as related to remembering, this work brings into question 
what is being measured when confidence ratings are taken during memory tasks. It seems worth 
considering whether autobiographical belief judgments for events and confidence judgments for 
event details reflect distinct processes. Brewer (1996) raises a similar point when defining ABM 
as comprised of three components: belief that the event happened, a recollected image, and 
confidence in the contents of the image. 
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Our approach emphasizes the former (judgments of occurrence), whereas Rubin (2006) 
emphasizes the latter (assessment of accuracy). To illustrate this distinction, consider Lerner and 
Lowe’s (1958) song “I remember it well,” which (when read literally) involves the character 
Honoré recalling to Marnita a time when they met in the past, to which she responds with 
corrections to the details that he provides. The opening lines are, “We met at nine. We met at 
eight. I was on time. No, you were late. Ah yes, I remember it well. We dined with friends. We 
dined alone. A tenor sang. A baritone. . . .” If he agrees with the revisions, his confidence in the 
details “nine” and “tenor” presumably decrease, confidence in “eight” and “baritone” increase, 
and his recollection is reconstructed, but without any effect at any point on the strength of the 
belief that the event occurred. 
This raises a number of implications. First, confidence ratings when taken for entire events may 
be confounded with autobiographical belief. Second, autobiographical belief and confidence in 
the details within recollections might, but also might not, reflect similar processes directed at 
different levels of knowledge specificity. The current data provide only preliminary evidence on 
the issue. Our data show that belief in recollection items load on the recollection factor and not 
on the autobiographical belief factor for believed memories, which is consistent with the idea of 
a distinction between recollection and “belief in recollection” (Fitzgerald & Broadbridge, 2013; 
Rubin, Burt, & Fifield, 2003; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003; Rubin & Siegler, 2004). The 
degree of separation between belief in occurrence and recollection also suggests that different 
monitoring processes might contribute to each. Thus, our approach and Rubin’s are 
complementary, in that they describe distinct types of beliefs about events—whether they are 
believed to have occurred, and whether the representation is viewed to be accurate. 
Belief in Occurrence and Recognition Memory 
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Our discussion has focused on autobiographical memory. In the context of situating the current 
work generally within the field, it is also pertinent to consider the utility of theorizing about 
belief in occurrence in relation to more basic cognitive models of recognition. Current theorizing 
on recognition memory tends to overlook how non-memorial information can influence 
judgments of past occurrence. This is not to say that there are no studies on the effects of context 
information. Indeed, many studies have looked at situations in which context information is 
given to participants when judging past occurrence. For example, a body of research investigates 
how memory reports of an event provided by one person affect another person’s memory report 
for the same event (e.g., Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, 2006; Roediger et al., 2001). In this case 
the other person’s memory report constitutes context information for one’s own memory for the 
event. However, these studies seem to look at this phenomenon from a perspective in which 
context information serves to mislead a person (but see Rajaram & Pereira-Pasarin, 2007), either 
by contradicting a true memory for an event (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; Wright, Gabbert, 
Memon, & London, 2008) or by implanting a false belief when no memory exists (Lindsay & 
Johnson, 1989; Meade & Roediger, 2002). This line of enquiry was first proposed in research on 
the misinformation effect (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978) and has recently been developed in the 
studies looking at the so called social conformity effects (Gabbert, Memon, & Allen, 2003). In 
this view, context information that contradicts memory is simply wrong and thus strategies of 
discounting such context information are necessary to protect the accuracy of memory reports. 
The perspective we propose differs substantially from this tradition. We wish to argue that non-
memorial, belief-like information is often used for the better to inform recognition judgments, 
particularly in situations in which memory is absent or fails. A similar argument is made by 
Jaeger, Cox, and Dobbins (2012), who stress the importance of what they term context 
BELIEF IN OCCURRENCE AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY 37 
 
information for old/new item recognition judgments. They note that people should normally be 
able to enhance the accuracy of reports by using information provided by external sources and 
maintain that under normal circumstances there should be no reason to expect that other people’s 
memory reports are systematically wrong. 
Hence, it often makes sense to incorporate information provided by others into one’s own 
reports. The benefit of this approach is that it describes the final decision (old-new) in a 
recognition task as a function of both memory and context information. Typically recognition 
judgments are investigated using a procedure in which participants are asked to judge whether a 
test probe was presented earlier. Such old-new judgments are thought to derive from positioning 
the probe along a continuum representing the strength of the signal. The so called dual-process 
models (Yonelinas, 1994, 2001) postulate two processes, familiarity and recollection (note: 
this is a distinct use of the term recollection than in the current article), that affect the strength of 
the signal. The strength of the recollection signal serves to unequivocally indicate that the probe 
is “old,” without the need to consult the familiarity strength of the probe. Jaeger et al. (2012) 
found that context information affected the placement of the familiarity criterion while having no 
effect on decisions based on recollection. 
Consistent with this approach, we suggest that current recognition models concentrate on 
memorial aspects and do not consider the act of remembering in its whole complexity, which 
includes non-memorial information as an integral component. 
We think that integrating models of recognition with our results within the framework of 
autobiographical remembering may prove fruitful for the development of models in which 
memory is analyzed in its real complexity, and for our understanding of the processes involved 
in real-life remembering. We claim, along with Wixted (2007), that judgments of occurrence are 
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based on strength of evidence, which can be conceived as a single dimension created by 
integrating information provided not only by familiarity and recollection, but also by all other 
available non-memorial information. In other words, the notion of evidence in a memory task 
should be extended to incorporate non-memorial information sources. Within this framework, 
the sources are jointly used to arrive at the conclusion about what happened in the past. Belief in 
occurrence in this context might be understood as a person’s interpretation of the event’s 
placement on this strength of evidence dimension. One potential outcome is disagreement 
between memorial and non-memorial signals, a situation we already discussed, in which 
additional processes (e.g., weighing information) will be activated to inform the decision. This 
results in a flexible memory system which is capable of editing and reinterpreting both 
recollection and familiarity-based output and also other evidence. 
What this approach accomplishes is to recognize that the decision whether an event occurred can 
be reached in the absence of familiarity or recollection, and also that nonmemorial information 
can discount recollection. For the present, this approach is mute on how evidence from different 
sources is merged or weighted to create the strength of evidence dimension. It seems intuitively 
obvious that recollection carries substantial weight when present, and that recollected events are 
commonly placed high on the evidence dimension. We suggest that the views proposed here can 
facilitate understanding the relation between recognition memory and phenomena examined 
outside the laboratory. This approach may also prove useful for understanding effects obtained in 
the laboratory that are not easily captured by existing frameworks, as they stress memory 
processes while largely ignoring external information (e.g., diagnostic monitoring; Gallo, 2004). 
Conclusion 
The take home message is that recollective memory is not the sole basis for judging the 
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occurrence of events. Most, if not all, would agree that there are autobiographical events that are 
believed to have occurred, even though no memory is retrieved. For example, we are told what 
happened when we were young and we tend to believe such stories. More surprisingly, research 
shows that there are also vivid recollections that are not believed to have occurred (e.g., Mazzoni 
et al., 2010). The research presented in this article demonstrates a strong distinction between 
belief in occurrence and recollection. The processes that impact recollection tend to be internal 
and cognitive/memorial in nature. The processes that impact autobiographical belief originate in 
both internal and external experience and are strongly socially mediated. In order to fully 
understand judgments about occurrence, which represent the final step in any memory task, it is 
important to consider the variety of sources and influences, both memorial and social, from 
which beliefs about the past are derived. 
This leads us to consider what advantages there might be to the existence of these two relatively 
distinct systems both relating to remembering the past. One possibility is that recollection and 
autobiographical belief each serve as checks on the other. The origins of each can be quite 
distinct. Recollection tends to be rooted in direct experience, whereas autobiographical belief can 
be derived from a variety of internal signals or environmental sources. A believed memory is the 
recollection of an event that is believed to derive from direct experience. When the belief is 
challenged by discrepant information, it is clearly not adaptive to immediately and always agree 
with the new information and discard the memory as definitively erroneous. It is possible that the 
new information is itself in error, in which case a hasty change in belief would have been 
unwarranted. The presence of recollection and its strength might serve as a check for the 
reliability of the discordant information.  
Recollection thus could modulate the belief. The same could occur with the belief. A strong 
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belief might modulate the content of the memory, as is implied in some models on the 
creation of false memories (e.g., Hyman & Kleinknecht, 1999; Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002; 
Scoboria et al., 2004). What the current data suggest is that this reciprocal modulation of the two 
systems is not limited to the creation of false memories but might be a characteristic of human 
memory in general. 
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autobiographical belief and recollection in both studies and, hence, was dropped from all 
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Table 1 
Distribution of difference scores between the belief in occurrence and recollection factors 
Belief less recollection score %age 
Below zero 2.6% 
Zero to .99 34.9% 
1 to 1.99 24.2% 
2 to 2.99 19.0% 
3 to 3.99 10.5% 
4 to 4.99 5.9% 
5 to 5.99 2.0% 
6 to 7 0.9% 
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Table 2 
Study 1, Coefficients when predicting belief in occurrence and recollection from memory 
characteristic items. 
   Autobiographical  
belief  Recollection  
 Item Coefficient Sig. Coefficient Sig. 
Initial prediction model Perceptual 0.01  0.38 <.001 
Setting 0.18 0.006 0.23 <.001 
Reexperience 1 0.00  0.28 <.001 
Plausibility 0.61 < .001 0.10 0.003 
Feeling intensity 0.06  0.09 0.008 
Persuade -0.07  -0.14 <.001 
Specific 0.08   0.09 0.024 
Trimmed prediction model Perceptual   0.38 <.001 
Setting 0.21 0.002 0.24 <.001 
Reexperience 1   0.28 <.001 
Plausibility 0.63 < .001 0.09 0.003 
Feeling intensity   0.08 0.006 
Persuade   -0.14 <.001 
Specific     0.08 0.024 
 
Note: The coefficients were derived using Structural Equation modeling. In the initial model, all seven items were 
used to predict both the autobiographical belief and recollection factors. The trimmed model included only pathways 
that were statistically significant in the initial model. 1 – Average of ‘reliving’ and ‘mental time travel’ items. 
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Table 3 
Study 2, Coefficients when predicting belief in occurrence and recollection from memory 
characteristic items for event types simultaneously. 
  Autobiographical  
belief Recollection 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Believed 
memory 
Personal plausibility 0.64 < 0.001 0.23 < 0.001 
Setting 0.19 < 0.001 0.32 < 0.001 
Feeling intensity   0.20 0.004 
Persuade -0.11 0.061 -0.16 0.018 
Reexperience   0.15 0.069 
Visual detail   0.24 0.013 
Connected -0.04 0.439   
Nonbelieved 
memory 
Personal plausibility 0.62 < 0.001 0.15 0.047 
Setting -0.01 0.553 0.26 0.003 
Feeling intensity   0.11 0.130 
Persuade -0.38 < 0.001 -0.18 0.011 
Reexperience   0.17 0.046 
Visual detail   0.33 < 0.001 
Connected 0.10 0.002   
Believed not-
remembered 
event 
Personal plausibility 0.82 < 0.001 -0.20 < 0.001 
Setting -0.03 0.896 0.28 < 0.001 
Feeling intensity   -0.07 0.306 
Persuade -0.10 0.040 -0.15 0.012 
Reexperience   0.48 < 0.001 
Visual detail   0.08 0.303 
Connected 0.10 0.024   
 
Note: This model replicates the trimmed model identified in Study 1, with the addition of the ‘connectedness to 
other events in memory’ item as loading onto the autobiographical belief factor, and adding a pathway for the 
‘persuade’ item to autobiographical belief. 
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Figure 1.  
Event categories resulting from crossing of autobiographical belief and recollection, and 
autobiographical belief and recollection as continuous dimensions. 
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Figure 2. Study 1, Item loadings for two factor confirmatory model. Belief Occ – Belief in 
occurrence latent factor. Reccol – Recollection latent factor. BE: ABMQ belief item; BS: Belief 
strength item; ME: ABMQ memory item; MS: Memory strength item; RK: Remember/know 
item. 
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Figure 3. Study 2, Final structural model. Each event (nonbelieved memory, believed memory, 
believed not-remembered event) is modeled simultaneously. Statistically significant latent 
variable correlations are indicated by *. All factor loadings are statistically significant.  
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Figure 4. Study 2, Mean belief in occurrence and recollection ratings for believed memories, 
nonbelieved memories, believed not remembered events, and not believed not remembered 
events. Bars show standard errors. 
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Appendix A –Belief in Occurrence and Recollection Items 
 
Belief in occurrence 
1. How likely is it that you personally did in fact experience this event? 1  
1 Definitely did not happen; 8 Definitely happened 
2. How strong is your belief that this event actually occurred (whether or not you remember the 
event)? 3 
1 No belief, 3 Weak belief, 5 Moderate belief, 7 Strong belief 
3. It is true that this event occurred to me. * 3 
1 Not at all true; 7 Extremely true 
 
Recollection 
1. Do you actually remember experiencing this event? 1 
1 No memory of event at all, 8 Clear and complete memory of event 
2. How strong is your memory for this event (whether or not you believe the event occurred)? 3 
1 No memory, 3 Weak memory, 5 Moderate memory, 7 Strong memory 
3. Sometimes people know something happened to them without being able to actually 
remember it. As I think about the event, I can actually remember it rather than just knowing 
that it happened. 2 
1 Not at all, 3 Vaguely, 5 Distinctly, 7 As much as any memory 
 
1 – From Scoboria et al. (2004). 2 - From Rubin, Schrauf & Greenberg (2003). 3 – New item. * 
Study 2 only. 
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Description of structural modeling approach 
 
One approach to construct validation is via confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), which is 
a member of a family of statistical techniques termed structural equation modeling. All structural 
equation modeling techniques require that one or more theoretical models be specified in 
advance of testing the fit of data to the model. In confirmatory analysis the specification of the 
theoretical model precedes the data; it is a restrictive, hypothesis testing approach. In CFA, the 
researcher states what factors will be present, and onto which specific factor(s) items will load. 
Data are then used to evaluate the extent to which the model explains covariance amongst the 
measured variables. 
CFA models 
We used CFA to examine the validity of items used to assess recollection and belief in 
the occurrence of events, and to test various hypotheses about how recollection and belief relate 
to each other within each type of event and across events as is appropriate according to Brown 
(2006). A strength of CFA is that various hypotheses can be modeled simultaneously. Hence 
CFA allowed us to test whether recollection is independent of belief in occurrence, validate the 
measures used to assess belief and recollection, estimate their intercorrelations, and to test for the 
influence of potential methodological confounds. Below we provide the technical details of this 
Supplement  S2 
 
analysis, followed by a discussion of the findings. 
 Data Analysis. For fitting the various CFA models, we used Robust Maximum 
Likelihood estimation method with the Satorra and Bentler (1994) χ2 correction as well as the 
robust fit measures, as the assumptions of multivariate normality were not met due to some 
variables having excessive kurtosis.  
To assess model fit, we followed the recommendations of Jackson, Gillaspy, and Purc-
Stephenson (2009) and report the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) and the Standardized Root Mean Residual (SRMR). We did not set a 
priori cutoff values for model fit, as these should be based on the research domain (Marsh, Hau, 
& Wen, 2004). Since there is little work in this area, it is premature to adopt specific cutoffs. We 
based our choices on model comparison, theoretical appropriateness and empirical fit. Typically, 
good fit is indicated by high CFI (about .95 and above), low RMSEA (about .06 and below), and 
low SRMR (about .08 and below). We also examined the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC, 
Akaike, 1987) which is recommended when comparing non-hierarchically ordered models. 
Study 1 
In Study 1, we tested two relatively straightforward structural models. In the first model 
we examined whether the five items loaded on a single latent variable. In the second model we 
examined whet the items loaded onto distinct autobiographical belief and recollection factors. 
Via CFA we examined the assumptions: 1) that belief in occurrence and recollection are 
independent latent constructs, 2) that indicators of each construct load reliably onto each latent 
construct. Full details of these models are provided in the paper.  
Six multivariate outliers were removed based on Mahalanobis’ D2, using a cut-off 
corresponding to p < .001, resulting in a final total of 287 cases. Two models were then tested in 
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EQS VERSION 6.1, using robust estimation for Chi-square, fit indices, and standard errors. 
Model fit was assessed per the recommendations of Jackson, Gillaspy, and Purc-Stephenson 
(2009). A model with the five belief and recollection items loading on the same latent factor did 
not fit the data well, Satorra-Bentler (S-B; Satorra & Bentler, 1994) Scaled χ2 (5) = 76.42, p < 
.001; CFI = .729; RMSEA = .227 (90% CI .183 to .271). The proposed two factor model was a 
good fit to the data, S-B χ2 (4) = 7.61, p = .055; CFI = .986; RMSEA = .073 (90% CI 0.000 to 
0.140). The item loadings and the factor correlation are presented in Figure 2. We used 1000 
bootstrap samples for the two factor model, and found agreement between significance tests 
related to loadings of measured variables on latent variables. 
Study 2 
In Study 2 we tested a basic model in which we theorized that belief and recollection 
would manifest as distinct latent variables across the different types of events elicited 
(nonbelieved memories, believed memories, believed not remembered events), followed by a 
series of refined models in order to account for alternative explanations to this main hypothesis. 
The specifics of the various models and details of the statistical approach are provided below. 
Via CFA we examined the assumptions: 1) that belief in occurrence and recollection are 
independent latent constructs, 2) that indicators of each construct load reliably onto each latent 
construct, and 3) that correlations between the factors are higher for believed memories, and 
lower within the other events and when aggregated across events. 
Models Tested. 
Models were tested with and without five extreme multivariate outliers (on Mahalanobis’ 
Distance using p < .001). The results suggested that the outliers attenuated most factor loadings 
and one factor correlation. Thus, we report the findings without these outliers. We used EQS 
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(6.1) for all analyses. 
 We used six items to assess the characteristics of each event, three to assess belief in 
occurrence (ABMQ belief, belief strength, true occurrence), and three to assess recollection 
(ABMQ memory, memory strength, remember/know). We used these items to form two latent 
variables, belief and recollection, for each event. 
 All models were identified according to the counting rule (see e.g., Kline, 2010). The 
scale of each latent variable was set by fixing one of the indicator paths to 1.0 – so called unit 
loading identification. The models are described in Table S1. All of the models shared the 
feature that each event was best represented by two latent variables, belief in occurrence and 
recollection. Each model tested a different hypothesis about the structure of ratings for the three 
events. To summarize, Model 1 specified the basic proposed latent variable loadings and 
correlations between separate belief in occurrence and recollection latent variables within events. 
The subsequent models added latent variable correlations between events (Model 2), correlated 
error terms for repetitions of the same item across the three events to account for repeated 
measures (Model 3), and the combination of both (Model 4).  
 Based on the theoretical rational and the results of Study 1, we anticipated that Model 1 
would fit the data reasonably well. The subsequent models examine whether accounting for 
method variance and/or individual differences in responding influence the parameter estimates. 
Model 2 seems plausible as it allows for the two processes of belief and recognition to correlate 
within events and for common processes to correlate across events, and should provide good fit 
because of the relaxation of the assumption of independence of common processes across events. 
Model 3 should provide a greater fit if some of the covariance across is due to similar item 
wording, rather than just the processes the items measure. Model 4 is a combination of Models 2 
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and 3. We anticipated that Model 4 would show very good fit to the data because, relative to the 
other models, it includes a large number of parameters to account for observed covariances.  
Model 3 provides for a test of method variance. The same prompts were used for each 
event to gather ratings on each event. Each item was used as an indicator of autobiographical or 
recollection across all three event types: believed memories, believed not-recalled memories, and 
non-believed memories. This introduces a potential confound into the study design and raises the 
possibility that method variance could be biasing the parameter estimates in our model. Model 3 
addresses this question through a form of multi-trait multi-method analysis known by using the 
correlated trait correlated uniqueness approach (e.g., Marsh & Grayson, 1995). By allowing the 
error variances of like prompts to covary across events, we are testing the hypothesis that events 
are correlated, at least in part, by the use of these common methods. The extent of the 
improvement in fit indicates whether method variance represents a substantial confound to our 
conclusions. We note that Models 3 and 4 were conducted to assess the impact of the repetition 
of measurements across the events. Because the main finding of Models 3 and 4 was that 
repetition of measurements had no meaningful influence on the parameters in Model 2 (see 
below), Model 2 is the final model presented in the main paper. 
We note that there are other approaches to conducting multi-trait multi-method analyses 
in the SEM framework and one that corresponds more closely to Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) 
approach. This approach involves specifying methods as latent variables. Unfortunately, this 
method can very frequently result in failures to converge on an appropriate solution, including 
out of range parameter estimates (see e.g., Brown, 2006). It is for this reason that we chose to use 
the correlated-trait correlated-method approach to investigating the question of whether our 
inferences were confounded by method variance. 
Supplement  S6 
 
Table S1. Summary of models tested (Study 2) 
 
Model Specification To test 
 
1 
 
Belief in occurrence and recollection 
latent variables for each event are 
allowed to correlate within events (e.g., 
within believed memories). 
 
Reflects independent processes for belief in 
occurrence and recollection. Reflects an association 
between belief in occurrence and recall that is context 
dependent – i.e., these latent variables can correlate 
and correlations can vary from one event type to 
another. 
 
2 Same as Model 1, but includes 
correlations among common latent 
variables across events e.g., recollection 
for believed memory is allowed to 
correlate with recollection for non-
believed, etc.  
In addition to Model 1, reflects the hypothesis that the 
processes of belief in occurrence and recollection 
potentially covary due to individual differences. 
Positive correlations would be indicative of an 
overarching influence of individual difference(s) for 
recall and belief in recognition. 
 
3 Same as model 1 with the addition of 
allowing covariances for item error 
terms across events for each latent 
variable. 
This model reflects the hypothesis that some portion 
of the relationship among belief in occurrence and 
recollect latent variables across events is due to 
similarities in item wording. Thus like items are 
allowed to be associated via covariances among error 
terms. This is consistent with modeling method 
variance. 
 
4 Model 2 and Model 3 combined Test impact of intercorrelated latent variables and 
controlling method variance simultaneously. Indicates 
whether the combination of both exceeds the 
contribution of either model alone. Better fit of this 
model indicates that accounting for both method 
variance and latent variable correlations best explains 
the relationships amongst the latent variables. 
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CFA modeling results 
 Table S2 contains fit information for each model described above. Many of the indices 
indicated reasonable fit relative to the data in most areas of research in psychology (see e.g., 
Jackson et al., 2009). Models 4 and 2 had the lowest AIC values, indicating the best fit taking 
into account parsimony. According to the RMSEA, Models 2, 3 and 4 had similar fit.  
 
 
Table S2. Fit Information for All Tested Models (Study 2) 
Model S-B χ2 Df CFI RMSEA RMSEA LO RMSEA HI SRMR 
1 195.70 131 0.961 0.047 0.030 0.062 0.093 
2 178.15 125 0.970 0.042 0.023 0.058 0.082 
3 158.25 112 0.967 0.046 0.027 0.063 0.089 
4 143.10 106 0.972 0.044 0.023 0.061 0.080 
 
Note: S-B χ2 = Satorra-Bentler χ2; df = degrees of freedom; AIC = Aikaike’s Information Criterion; CFI = 
Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; RMSEA LO = 5th percentile 
confidence interval for RMSEA; RMSEA HI = 95th percentile confidence interval for RMSEA; SRMR = 
Standardized Root Mean Residual. All values except SRMR are based on the S-B robust χ2 estimate. 
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Best fitting CFA model 
 We now review the findings for the final model (Model 2). Figure S1 contains a drawing 
of this model with the standardized factor loadings for each item on the latent variables and the 
latent variable correlations. We briefly describe this figure, to assist readers who may be less 
familiar with CFA modeling techniques. Latent (unobserved) variables are indicated by ovals. 
There are three latent variables each for belief and recollection, one for each type of event. The 
measured items (observed variables) are indicated by rectangles. Three items define each latent 
variable. Arrows point from the latent variables to the observed variables, indicating the 
assumption that an underlying process gives rise to item responses. The latent variables on the 
left side of the figure depict belief in occurrence, and those on the right side depict recollection. 
The circles to the extreme right and left of the figure represent the residual variance associated 
with each measured item. Double-arrowed curved lines indicate correlations. The correlations 
toward the interior are estimated correlations between the latent variables. All of the item 
loadings onto latent variables were statistically significant. The correlations between  
the latent variables within event were all statistically significant. This correlation was substantial 
for believed memories (.45), lower for non-believed memories (.30), and negative for believed-
not-remembered events (-.17).  
The correlations for belief and recollection between believed memories and believed-not-
remembered events were significant but weak. The correlations for belief and recollection 
between non-believed memories and the other events were not significant. This indicates that 
individuals did not respond to the events systematically, with some rating all events higher and 
others rating all events lower. Hence individual differences were distributed mostly 
independently across the events, further supporting the theoretical distinction between belief in 
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occurrence and recollection. The implications of this best fitting model are discussed below. 
Turning to Models 3 and 4, of the 18 error correlations, just two were significant. This 
suggests that method variance (using the same items to rate multiple events) did not notably 
influence estimates for the other model parameters. In other words, the sampling method worked 
well – people made distinct ratings about the different events.  
 Bootstrap Results 
To assure of the accuracy of significance levels in the presence of non-normality, we also 
utilized a bootstrapping approach (e.g., Efron, 1979). Bootstrapping has the advantage of 
relaxing the statistical assumption of multivariate normality (Yung & Bentler, 1996). In 
bootstrapping, observations from the data set are sampled with replacement repeatedly, which 
allows for the construction of empirically based confidence intervals. We used 1000 bootstrap 
samples for Model 4-r, and found agreement between significance tests related to latent variable 
correlations, loadings of measured variables on latent variables, and the correlated error terms. 
This shows that the best fitting model was robust to violation of the normality assumption. 
In summary, our theoretical modeling converged on a best fitting model with excellent fit 
to the data. This model was robust to concerns regarding item distribution, method variance due 
to repeated sampling of items, and responding due to individual differences. This model provides 
compelling evidence for the dissociation between belief in occurrence and recollection. 
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Figure S1. Final structural model (Model 2). Each event (nonbelieved memory, believed 
memory, believed not-remembered event) is modeled simultaneously. Statistically significant 
latent variable correlations are indicated by *. All factor loadings are statistically significant.  
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